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The North Atlantic Treaty and
European Security after
the Cold War
Introduction
The recent dramatic events in Europe, notably the reunification of Ger-
many, the collapse of Communist rule in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union, the start of Soviet troop withdrawals, and the demise of the War-
saw Pact, represent an historic political triumph for the countries of the
North Atlantic Alliance. At the same time, these developments have
called into question the Alliance's continued relevance in a radically new
environment.
At a time of far-reaching change, it is imperative to ask fundamental
questions about the nature of security in Europe, the threats to that
security, and the institutions best suited both to protect and to promote
security in the years ahead. In particular, does the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization ("NATO") have any major role to play in fostering secur-
ity and constructive change in Europe in the coming decade and
beyond? If so, what changes in NATO's purposes and organizational
structure should be considered?
As they grapple with these questions, the member states of the Alli-
ance must address four basic issues: First, what political role could the
Alliance usefully play in furthering security and stability in Europe and
should this role differ in significant respects from the Alliance's political
role in the past? Second, what military role, if any, could the Alliance
usefully perform? Third, should the Alliance attempt to address security
threats that arise outside the North Atlantic area? And, finally, what
relationship should NATO have to other European institutions, such as
the European Community ("EC"), the Western European Union
("WEU"), and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
* B.A., Swarthmore; D. Phil., Oxford; J.D., Yale. Associate Professor of Law,
Georgetown University Law Center.
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("CSCE")? Ultimately, the members of the Alliance must ask whether
NATO should continue to exist as a central institution addressing Euro-
pean security in the decades ahead.
This Article will address these questions. It begins by briefly exam-
ining the original purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty and the subse-
quent evolution of the NATO organization to gain a sense of the history
and possible flexibility of the Alliance in response to radically changed
circumstances. Against this historical background, this Article will then
assess the prospects and the merits of efforts to redefine NATO's pur-
poses, organization, and forces in light of the new challenges to security
in Europe that are currently evolving.
I. Original Threats, Original Purposes
The years immediately following World War II witnessed a breakdown
of the wartime coalition as the Soviet Union rapidly expanded and con-
solidated its power in Eastern Europe. Faced with a daunting task of
economic reconstruction, West Europeans feared a continued expan-
sion of Soviet power and influence in a westward direction. They were
also anxious about the future evolution of post-war Germany. In the
Brussels Treaty of 1948, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg formed a security alliance to protect against the possibility
of a renewed threat from Germany.' At the same time, Britain led
efforts to secure a treaty commitment from the United States to the
defense of Western Europe. 2 The negotiations over a formal U.S. com-
mitment culminated in the North Atlantic Treaty, which was signed in
Washington, D.C., on April 4, 1949, 3 a few months before the Soviet
Union tested its first atomic bomb.4 The American security guarantee,
backed by the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal, was designed to deter
Soviet intimidation or military aggression against Western Europe and
to restore political confidence and stability as the European allies rebuilt
1. The parties to the Brussels Treaty agreed, inter alia, "to take such steps as may
be held necessary in the event of renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression."
Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense,
Mar. 17, 1948, 19 U.N.T.S. 51, 53. This text was subsequently deleted when the
Treaty was modified by Protocol No. 1 of the 1954 Paris Agreements, and it was
replaced with the phrase "to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive
integration of Europe." Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in
the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 4117, T.I.A.S. No. 3428,
331 U.N.T.S. 253.
2. See Hendrickson, The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance, in AMERICAN
DEFENSE POLICY 298-99 (J. Reichart & S. Sturm eds., 5th ed. 1982). See generally N.
HENDERSON, THE BIRTH OF NATO (1983).
3. North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949, 4 Bevans 828, 63 Stat. 2241, T.I.A.S.
No. 1964, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter North Atlantic Treaty]. The original signato-
ries to the North Atlantic Treaty included Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ice-
land, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Great Britain, and the
United States.
4. M. BUNDY, DANGER AND SURVIVAL 197 (1988).
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their devastated economies. 5 The American guarantee also served to
reassure Germany's neighbors, particularly France, against any possible
future threat from Germany.6
The heart of the Treaty is Article 5, in which the parties agree that
"an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all" and that in the
event of such an attack, each of them, exercising the right of self-
defense, will take forthwith "individually and in concert with the other
Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed
force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
' 7
The parties also pledge, in Article 3, to develop their "individual and
collective capacity to resist armed attack" by means of "continuous and
effective self-help and mutual aid."8 Article 5's collective defense com-
mitment is limited by Article 6 to attacks on allied territory, vessels or
aircraft within a defined North Atlantic area.9
At the same time, the Treaty provides for political consultation on
security concerns that are not limited in geographical scope. Thus, Arti-
cle 4 states that "[t]he Parties will consult together whenever, in the
opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence
or security of any of the Parties is threatened." 10 More broadly, Article
2 provides that "[tihe Parties will contribute toward the further develop-
ment of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening
their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the
principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting
conditions of stability and well-being."' 1
The Treaty is flexible with respect to the development of imple-
menting institutions. Article 9 established a Council, on which each
party would be represented, to consider implementation of the Treaty.
The Council was given the flexibility to "set up such subsidiary bodies as
may be necessary."' 12 The only specific task imposed on the Council by
the Treaty was to establish immediately a defense committee to recom-
mend measures to implement Articles 3 and 5.13
The Treaty is flexible in another respect: it provides that the parties
can, by unanimous agreement, "invite any other European state in a
position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the
5. See R. OSGOoD, NATO: THE ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 30-32 (1961).
6. See T. IRELAND, CREATING THE ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 4-5 (1981).
7. North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 3, 4 Bevans, at 829.
8. Id.
9. Id. Article 6 was revised somewhat by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North
Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey, Oct. 17, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 43,
T.I.A.S. 2390, 126 U.N.T.S. 350, which entered into force on Feb. 15, 1952 [herein-
after Protocol].
10. North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 3, 4 Bevans, at 829.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 830.
13. Id.
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security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty."1 4 Greece
and Turkey joined the Alliance in 1952,15 as did the Federal Republic of
Germany in 1955,16 and post-Franco Spain in 1982.17 The Treaty also
recognizes the need for reassessment in light of changing circumstances.
While parties could withdraw after the Treaty had been in force for
twenty years,' 8 any party could request after ten years that the allies
"consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having
regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North
Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional
arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the mainte-
nance of international peace and security."' 9
The relationship of the Alliance to the United Nations was an issue
of concern to the drafters of the North Atlantic Treaty. The allies ini-
tially took differing views on whether the Alliance constituted a regional
arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.20 This issue was
significant because regional arrangements are obliged under Article 53
of the UN Charter to obtain Security Council authorization before
engaging in "enforcement actions."'2 1 The French took the view that
the Alliance was both a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII and a
collective defense system under Article 51 of the UN Charter.22 The
British, in contrast, distinguished between a collective defense arrange-
ment based on Article 51 directed against attacks from outside the mem-
bership of the Alliance, on the one hand, and regional arrangements
designed to perform regional functions, such as the settling of disputes
between members, on the other.23 Ultimately, the allies decided to omit
any reference to Chapter VIII in the Treaty and agreed that they would
stress the relationship of the Alliance to Article 51 in their public
statements.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in its report recom-
mending ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty, voiced concern about
14. Id.
15. See Protocol, supra note 9, which entered into force on February 15, 1952.
16. Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 5707, T.I.A.S. No. 3428, which entered into
force on May 5, 1955 [hereinafter Protocol on Accession of Fed. Rep. Germany].
17. Protocol of Accession of Spain to the North Atlantic Treaty, Dec. 10-11,
1981, 34 U.S.T. 3508, T.I.A.S. No. 10564, which entered into force on May 30, 1982.
18. North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 3, 4 Bevans, at 831 (art. XIII).
19. Id. (art. XII).
20. See N. HENDERSON, supra note 2, at 101-03.
2 1. Article 53 of the UN Charter provides that, with one exception, "no enforce-
ment action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies with-
out the authorization of the Security Council." U.N. CHARTER art. 53.
22. N. HENDERSON, supra note 2, at 101. Article 51 of the UN Charter provides:
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or col-
lective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain interna-
tional peace and security." U.N. CHARTER art. 51. On collective defense, see Y. DIN-
STEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE 230-53 (1988).
23. N. HENDERSON, supra note 2, at 102.
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the Treaty's relationship to the United Nations in another respect. The
Committee expressed the view that political consultation under Article 4
of the Treaty (on threats to the territorial integrity, political indepen-
dence, or security of the parties) "should not be held under the treaty
unless the United Nations is for some reason prevented from dealing
with the particular situation which has arisen." 24 On the question
whether the Treaty established a regional arrangement under Chapter
VIII of the UN Charter, however, the Committee was agnostic: while
the Treaty was designed primarily to establish a collective defense
organization, it was "not necessary to define the organization . . .as
exclusively one or the other" and it could be "utilized as a regional
arrangement under chapter VIII or in any way" that would help accom-
plish the purposes of the UN Charter.25
II. From Treaty to Integrated Military Organization
The Congressional hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty indicate the
fundamental importance placed on the economic recovery of Western
Europe by executive branch officials and members of Congress alike.
26
The security guarantee provided by the Treaty together with U.S. mili-
tary assistance were seen as central to restoring the confidence and eco-
nomic health so vital to the security of Western Europe. The hearings
also reveal that it was generally understood in 1949 that U.S. military
assistance to Europe would take the form of equipment and supplies,
not ground troops.2 7 Executive branch witnesses downplayed the pros-
pect that U.S. ground forces would be deployed in Europe pursuant to
Article 3. When asked by Senator Hickenlooper, for example, whether
Americans were "going to be expected to send substantial numbers of
troops over there as a more or less permanent contribution to the devel-
opment of these countries' capacity to resist," Secretary of State Dean
Acheson replied, "The answer to that question, Senator, is a clear and
absolute 'No.' "28
As is well known, the invasion of South Korea in June 1950 galva-
nized the transformation of the Alliance from a guarantee pact to an
integrated military organization. 29 Allied concerns about Soviet military
intentions led to the deployment of U.S. ground forces in Western
24. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NORTH ATLANTIc TREATY, S. REP.
No. 48, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1949) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
25. Id. at 22.
26. See, e.g., North Atlantic Treaty, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 37, 57 (1949) (testimony of Secretary of State Acheson)
[hereinafter Hearings]; id. at 131-132 (testimony of Warren R. Austin); id. at 145
(testimony of Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson).
27. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 26, at 40, 47 (testimony of Sec. of State Ache-
son); id. at 191, 195, 213, 217 (testimony of W. Averell Harriman); id. at 265 (testi-
mony of Robert A. Lovett); id. at 289, 291, 333 (testimony of General Omar N.
Bradley).
28. Id at 47 (testimony of Sec. of State Acheson).
29. See R. OSGOOD, supra note 5, at 74.
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Europe and the development of an integrated military command under
U.S. leadership. The Alliance adopted the Lisbon force goals in Febru-
ary 1952 which called for 96 NATO divisions by 1954.30 Such a build-
up was dependent upon a contribution from the Federal Republic of
Germany, which joined NATO in 1955.31 The ambitious Lisbon goals
were soon scaled back, however, as NATO followed the lead of the
Eisenhower Administration and adopted a "New Look" strategy which
was based on early use of nuclear weapons in response to a Soviet
attack.3 2 This nuclear strategy was based both on the belief that NATO
could not match the conventional strength of the Warsaw Pact and on
the assumption that the tactical use of nuclear weapons could offset any
NATO conventional inferiorities in a conflict.
By the late 1950s and early 1960s, criticism of NATO's overreliance
on nuclear weapons was growing. The Kennedy and Johnson Adminis-
trations led NATO's transition to a stronger conventional force posture
and a strategy of "flexible response." Formally adopted in 1967, flexible
response provided for an initial conventional defense to a conventional
aggression with the option of a deliberate escalation to nuclear weapons
if NATO's conventional forces could not contain an attack.3 3 Flexible
response remained NATO's declaratory strategy until the London Sum-
mit of July 1990, when Alliance leaders announced their intention to
adopt "a new NATO strategy making nuclear weapons truly weapons of
last resort."'34
What can we learn from this historical experience? First, the North
Atlantic Treaty is flexible both with respect to the means of self-defense
and the development of supporting institutions. The integrated military
organization we know today as NATO was by no means preordained by
the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty. Second, while the Treaty did not
preclude joint action in response to conflicts outside the NATO area, it
did not specifically provide for anything beyond consultation. The
Treaty's limitation on defense obligations to cases of armed attack
against allied territory within a defined North Atlantic area was a recog-
nition of the controversial nature of any efforts to reach agreement on
collective action on a broader geographical scale. Third, the relation-
ship of NATO to other global and regional institutions was never fully
joined: issues of competing responsibilities were not directly faced in
large part because the United Nations was a fledgling organization (and
limited in effectiveness by superpower disagreement) and other institu-
30. Id. at 87.
31. See Protocol on Accession of Fed. Rep. Germany, supra note 16. See also R.
OSGOOD, supra note 5, at 91-98.
32. See R. OSGOOD, supra note 5, at 102-46.
33. SeeJ. STRoMSrrl, THE ORIGINS OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 1, 175 (1988).
34. The London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, reprinted
in U.S. Department of State, Selected Document No. 38 (July 1990) [hereinafter
London Declaration], at 3. Whether making nuclear arms "weapons of last resort"
constitutes a real change in NATO strategy is subject to debate. See, e.g., Gordon,
Nuclear Strategy S, ft?, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1990, at Al.
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tions in Europe were not fully developed. In 1954, the original parties
to the Brussels Treaty of 1948 modified the treaty and formed the West-
ern European Union and invited West Germany and Italy to join.3 5 But
in the face of massive Soviet conventional forces in Eastern Europe and
considerable Soviet nuclear capabilities, NATO remained the focal point
of West European defense.3 6
M. New Threats, New Structures?
The dramatic changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union that have
occurred during the Gorbachev era have fundamentally altered the
nature of the threats to security in Europe. NATO's traditional worry
about Soviet capabilities for a massive short-warning conventional attack
on Western Europe is no longer a realistic concern as a result of the
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe ("CFE") Treaty and other Soviet
treaty commitments to withdraw Soviet forces from Eastern Europe.3 7
As the communique from the December 1990 ministerial meeting of the
North Atlantic Council stated, "[The risks that Allies now face in
Europe arise less from a likelihood of deliberate aggression against
Allied territory by former adversaries, than from the unforeseeable stra-
tegic consequences of instabilities that might emerge in a period of
rapid and widespread political and economic transformation. '" 3 8
In the decade ahead, the main threats and challenges to security in
Europe are likely to be fourfold. First, instabilities in the Soviet Union,
including the real possibility of violence within or between the republics,
35. P. BORCIER, THE ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION 14-17 (1975). The
Paris Agreements of 1954 are reprinted in NATO INFORMATION SERVICE, NATO
FACTS AND FIGURES 306-34 (1971).
36. In 1950, the military command structures of the Brussels Treaty Organization
were effectively folded into NATO organizational structures. See P. BORCER, supra
note 35, at 13-14.
37. The CFE Treaty was signed by the 22 member states of NATO and the War-
saw Pact on November 19, 1990. See Fact Sheet: The CFE Treaty, U.S. Department
of State Dispatch, Vol. 1, No. 13 (Nov. 26, 1990). In early 1991, disputes over Soviet
claims that certain combat equipment was exempt from the Treaty limits delayed the
Treaty's submission for Senate approval and deferred negotiations over a follow-on
treaty. See Gordon, Outlook is Cloudy for an Arms Deal by U.S. and Soviets, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 6, 1991, at Al. These disputes subsequently were resolved. See Friedman,
NATO-Warsaw Pact Arms Dispute Ends, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1991, at :3.
The Soviet Union has concluded bilateral treaties with Czechoslovakia and Hun-
gary providing for the withdrawal of Soviet forces by the end of 1991. See Gati, Cen-
tral Europe Is Scared, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1991, at A27. Poland hopes to conclude a
similar treaty with the Soviet Union but the negotiations have run into difficulties. See
Battiata, Soviets Rebuff Poles on Troop Pullout, Wash. Post, Feb. 13, 1991, at A14. Under
the terms of the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, the Soviet
Union is obligated to remove all its troops from German territory by 1994. See Arti-
cle 4(1), reprinted in Arms Control Today (Oct. 1990), at 34.
38. North Atlantic Council Ministerial Communique, December 1990 [hereinaf-
ter Communique], paragraph 4, reprinted in 38 NATO Review, No. 6, at 22 (Dec.
1990).
Cornell International Law Journal
might threaten to spill across borders or draw in outside participants.39
Moreover, substantial military capabilities still exist within the Soviet
Union, including diverse nuclear capabilities control of which is uncer-
tain and subject to change.40 Second, risks and challenges to European
security will arise from instabilities within Eastern Europe, including
ethnic conflicts, secessionist pressures, refugee flows, and the numerous
difficulties involved in making the transition to democracy and to viable
market economies. 41 Third, although often unspoken, Germany's
neighbors are concerned to see that Germany, with its considerable eco-
nomic, political, and military power, remains firmly rooted in Western
collective institutions. 42 Finally, threats to European security may arise
from outside Europe, as illustrated by the risks Turkey faced during the
Gulf War.
To what extent can NATO evolve in ways that make it more respon-
sive to the current challenges to European security? Can it, in the words
of a recent NATO communique, be "both an anchor of stability and an
agent of change"? 43 At the broadest level, such questions inevitably
raise the issue of the nature and desirability of an American commitment
to European security in the coming decades. The current U.S. adminis-
tration has argued that a strong North Atlantic Alliance, including active
American political engagement and a continuing U.S. military presence
in Europe, is the essential foundation for a secure Europe well into the
future.4 4 The United States recognizes that it exercises its greatest
influence on matters of European security in the councils of NATO, and
that American influence will diminish as broader European institutions
expand in scope and importance. In contrast, the French government
has taken the lead, along with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher
of Germany, in urging that the European Community ("EC") develop a
39. See, e.g., The United States and NATO in an Undivided Europe, Report by the Work-
ing Group on Changing Roles and Shifting Burdens in the Atlantic Alliance (1991)
[hereinafter Report], at 5-6; Olcott, The Soviet Dis(Union), 82 FOREIGN POLICY 118
(1991); Keller, In Soviet Life, Thaw Becomes Chill, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1991, at 1; Gati,
supra note 37.
40. See Report, supra note 39, at 11-12.
41. See, e.g., Nelson, Europe's Unstable East, 82 FOREIGN POLICY 137 (1991); Bohlen,
3 East European States Grope for Union, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1990, at 1:16; Heisbourg,
Population Movements in Post-Cold War Europe, 33 SURVIVAL 31 (Jan/Feb 1991). The
recent turmoil in Yugoslavia is but one illustration of the difficult problems facing
Eastern Europe. See Sudetic, Yugoslav Planes Strafe and Bombs Breakaway State, N.Y.
Times, June 29, 1991, at 1:1, col. 6.
42. See Report, supra note 39, at 6.
43. See Communique, supra note 38, at 24 (para. 17).
44. See, e.g., the following speeches: President Bush, NATO and the US Commitment
to Europe, May 4, 1990, reprinted in U.S. Department of State, Current Policy No. 1276,
at 2; Secretary of State Baker, A New Europe, A New Atlanticism: Architecture for a New
Era, Dec. 12, 1989, reprinted in U.S. Department of State, Current Policy No. 1233
[hereinafter A New Europe], at 2; Baker, The NA TO Alliance and the Future of Europe,June
7, 1990, reprinted in U.S. Department of State, Current Policy No. 1284, at 3. See also
Rosenthal, Bush Sees Revamped NATO as Core of Europe's Power, N.Y. Times, May 5,
1990, at I:4; Usborne, U.S. Warns EC Not to 'Disrupt' Role of NATO, Independent
(U.K.), Mar. 6, 1991, at 9.
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common security policy as well as a European military force, which
would be created by merging the WEU and the EC perhaps by the late
1990s. 45 Some of the other Western European allies, such as Italy, are
sympathetic to this position, while others, notably Britain and the
Netherlands, stress the need to preserve a strong transatlantic security
link through NATO and thus avoid actions that might distance the
United States from Western Europe.
4 6
In the face of these rather different visions of the future of Euro-
pean security, any effort to recast the Alliance's mission is bound to be
difficult, but it is not unprecedented. NATO recast its mission once
before in response to significantly changed circumstances in the Harmel
exercise of 1967, which took place during a time of growing interest in
detente with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe.
4 7
The Harmel Report, Future Tasks of the Alliance, stressed that "the polit-
ical tasks of the Alliance have assumed a new dimension" and that in
addition to its function of maintaining the military forces and political
cohesion necessary for deterrence and defense, the Alliance would pur-
sue a second function of working to resolve the underlying political
issues in Europe, most notably through a policy of detente.48 As the
Report concluded, "The ultimate political purpose of the Alliance is to
achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by
appropriate security guarantees." 49 By recognizing that "military secur-
ity and a policy of detente are not contradictory but complementary,"
but also stressing that "the pursuit of detente must not be allowed to
split the Alliance," the Harmel exercise helped the Alliance chart a
course through the changing circumstances of the next two decades. 50
In the present context, a new point of departure for the Alliance
was set by the NATO Summit of July 1990, which produced the London
45. See Franco-German Proposal for Joint EC Security Policy, The Week in Germany,
Feb. 8, 1991, at 2; Drozdiak, Europe Disunited in Gulf Response, Wash. Post, Feb. 19,
1991, at A6. Both Genscher and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl have stressed,
however, that NATO remains an essential part of the structure of European security
even as they have advocated that an integrated Western Europe and an expanded
CSCE play a greater security role in the future. See, e.g., Kohl, A United Germany in a
United Europe, June 5, 1990, reprinted in German Information Center, Statements &
Speeches, Vol. 13, No. 15, at 3; Kohl, Europe: Every German's Future, Statement deliv-
ered on Feb. 3, 1990, reprinted in Press Release, Embassy of the Federal Republic of
Germany, at 4,5,7; Genscher, A Vision for the Whole of Europe, Feb. 5, 1991, reprinted in
German Information Service, Statements & Speeches, Vol. 14, No. 3, at 3-5; Gen-
scher, The Future of a European Germany, Apr. 10, 1990, reprinted in German Information
Service, Statements & Speeches, Vol. 13, No. 9, at 2-5.
46. See Drozdiak, supra note 45; Fitchett, Dutch Show New Toughness on Defense, Int'l
Herald Tribune, Feb. 19, 1991; Riding, Western Europe Urges Air Embargo Against Iraq,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1990, at A12; Mauthner, U.S. Backs Stronger European Security and
Defense Role, London Financial Times, Dec. 18, 1990, at 2.
47. See Brockpahler, The Harmel Philosophy: NATO's Creative Strategy for Peace, 38
NATO REvIEW, No. 6, at 17 (Dec. 1990).
48. Future Tasks of the Alliance [hereinafter Harmel Report], reprinted in U.S. Depart-
ment of State, BULLETIN, Vol. 58 (Jan. 8, 1968), at 51.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance.5 1 In that historic docu-
ment, the allies extended "the hand of friendship" to their former Cold
War adversaries and proposed that the member states of the Warsaw
Treaty Organization as well as all other CSCE member States join in a
"joint declaration in which we solemnly state that we are no longer
adversaries" and affirm a commitment to non-aggression. 5 2 Such a dec-
laration was made in November 1990 by the twenty-two countries that
were members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.5 3 Following in the Har-
mel tradition, the NATO allies indicated in London their desire to
enhance the political dimension of the Alliance, as provided for by Arti-
cle 2 of the Treaty, in order to establish new partnerships with all the
nations of Europe and to help build new structures of a more united
continent. As a reflection of the Alliance's changing political role, the
allies invited President Gorbachev and representatives from the coun-
tries of Eastern Europe to address the North Atlantic Council and even
to establish regular diplomatic liaison and military contacts with
NATO. 54
The allies also declared in London that NATO's military forces and
strategy would be changed fundamentally in response to the new condi-
tions in Europe: NATO would prepare a new military strategy moving
away from its traditional "forward defense" to a reduced "forward pres-
ence" and modifying "flexible response" to make nuclear forces "truly
weapons of last resort." 5 5 NATO's reduced reliance on nuclear weap-
ons was reinforced in October 1991. Following a U.S. initiative to elimi-
nate all ground-based tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, including
artillery shells and short-range missiles, NATO leaders decided to cut in
half NATO's stockpiles of air-launched nuclear weapons. 56 The result
of these dramatic moves will be a remaining stockpile of about 700 air-
launched nuclear weapons in Western Europe, which represents a
reduction of eighty percent in NATO's existing nuclear arsenal.
NATO's initiatives to date are a sensible response to current trends.
But whether they can keep the Alliance both vital and relevant in the
future is far from clear. Analysis of this question can be divided into
four areas: (1) redefining NATO's military role; (2) redefining NATO's
political role; (3) NATO's role in conflicts outside the North Atlantic
area; and (4) NATO's relationship to other European security
institutions.
51. London Declaration, supra note 34.
52. Id. at 2 (paras. 4 & 6).
53. Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two States, Nov. 19, 1990, reprinted in 38 NATO
REVIEW, No. 6, at 26-27 (Dec. 1990).
54. London Declaration, supra note 34, at 2 (paras. 7 & 8).
55. Id. at 3 (paras. 18 & 20).
56. Riding, NATO to Cut Aircraft A-Bombs by 50a, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1991, at
A3.
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IV. Redefining NATO's Military Role
The London Declaration called for the preparation of "a new allied mili-
tary strategy" as well as "new force plans consistent with the revolution-
ary changes in Europe."' 5 7 That revision of NATO strategy and force
plans is expected to be completed by the end of 1991.58 As the North
Atlantic Council examines the broader questions of NATO's future role,
a Strategy Review Committee is developing a revised strategy focusing
on three objectives-protecting the peace, crisis management, and
deterring war.59 In tandem, NATO's Military Committee is examining
the forces needed to implement a revised strategy.
In the past, the fundamental military role of NATO has been clear
and compelling: to deter an aggression from the Warsaw Pact and to
defend NATO territory should such an aggression occur. The forces
designed to provide a forward defense of NATO territory have included
multinational forces divided into eight national corps equipped with
both conventional and nuclear weapons and deployed in layer-cake fash-
ion along the old inter-German border. The diminishing Soviet military
presence in Central and Eastern Europe coupled with the demise of the
Warsaw Pact on March 31, 1991,60 make the prospect of the tradition-
ally feared short-warning attack exceedingly unlikely. At the same time,
because the Soviet Union (however it is reconstituted) will retain sub-
stantial conventional and nuclear forces within its borders, the Alliance
should retain, as a matter of sheer prudence, a capability to deter and to
respond to a possible reconstituted threat for the time being. Just as the
Alliance enabled the Western Europeans to rebuild their economies
after World War II without fear of being left vulnerable to Soviet mili-
tary might, the Alliance can provide a backdrop of stability in Europe as
the Eastern Europeans transform their political and economic systems
and as the Europeans evaluate what sorts of institutional structures can
best promote security in Europe in the decades ahead.
57. Id. at 3 (para. 20).
58. See Mecham, NATO Defense Ministers Drafting Strategy Based on Smaller and More
Mobile Forces, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Dec. 17, 1990, at 70-71; Smith,
NATO Sets New Stancefor New Era, Wash. Post, May 29, 1991, at Al. In late May 1991,
NATO defense ministers agreed to a major reorganization of NATO forces which
will include a multinational rapid reaction force, seven defense corps in Central
Europe, and a significant reduction in U.S. forces in Europe. Id.; Montgomery,
NATO Is Planning to Cut U.S. Forces in Europe by 50/, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1991, at Al.
These and other modifications will be subject to formal approval at a meeting of
NATO heads of state scheduled for November 1991.
59. See excerpts of SACEUR's address to the Turkish War College, Istanbul, Tur-
key, Oct. 8, 1990, reprinted in ACE Output, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Nov. 1990), Public Informa-
tion Office, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)/Allied
Command Europe (ACE), at 14-15. See also Greenwood, Refashioning NA TO's Defenses,
38 NATO Review, No. 6, at 2 (Dec. 1990).
60. See Bohlen, Warsaw Pact Agrees to Dissolve Its Military Alliance by March 31, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 26, 1991, at Al. Soviet forces are due to be completely withdrawn from
Eastern Europe by the end of 1994. See Mauthner, A Common Defense for Europe,
London Financial Times, Dec. 11, 1990, at 17.
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The force posture that would enable NATO to serve this residual
deterrence function will be quite different from NATO's traditional for-
ward defense capability. Rather than a layer-cake forward defense pos-
ture, a more flexible, mobile "forward presence" at the frontiers of
NATO territory can serve to signify the Alliance's continued commit-
ment to the collective defense of its members. 6 ' Mobile forces are espe-
cially important in providing political reassurance to the countries at
NATO's northern and southern flanks, Norway and Turkey, which have
often felt somewhat distant from the central focus of the alliance.6 2 In
addition to more mobile forces, interest has grown in Alliance circles in
developing multinational units at the corps level, both as a response to
declining troop commitments in the face of a diminishing threat and as a
more politically palatable form of foreign troop presence on German
territory in the future.6 3 Indeed, in May 1991, NATO's defense minis-
ters agreed to create seven defense corps in Central Europe, six of
which will be multinational.r 4 After 1994, however, no non-German
forces can be stationed on former East German territory under the
terms of the treaty on the final settlement concerning Germany con-
cluded by the two Germanies, the Soviet Union, the United States, Brit-
ain, and France.6 5 Thus, the corps to be stationed on that territory will
be all-German.
Whether a substantial American troop presence in Europe should
continue for the next decade and beyond is an important issue that must
be faced squarely by the Alliance. At present, the allies are agreed that
some U.S. troop presence in Europe is desirable to preserve the transat-
lantic security link in the face of the many uncertainties now confronting
Europe. Even so, American ground forces in Europe are likely to be cut
in half in the next few years as a result of agreed modifications in
NATO's force posture.66 A continuing U.S. military presence in
Europe, even if greatly reduced, will still permit the United States to
play the role of both guarantor and balancer as the European allies sort
out what kind of "European security identity" is both desirable and
attainable.
61. For a useful discussion, see Greenwood, supra note 59, at 4-5; Mecham, supra
note 58.
62. See Report, supra note 39, at 13.
63. See Lowe & Young, Multinational Corps in NATO, 33 SURVIVAL 66-67 (Jan./Feb.
1991). See also Gordon, NATO Weighing New Look with Combined Allied Units, N.Y.
Times, May 23, 1990, at A8; White, UK-French Talks on Combined Forces, London Finan-
cial Times, Apr. 9, 1990, at A4; Healy, New NATO Strategy: Meld a Multinational Opera-
tion, L.A. Times, July 24, 1990, at 1.
64. See Montgomery, supra note 58.
65. Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, Arts. 4(1), 5(3),
reprinted in Arms Control Today, Oct. 1990, at 34.
66. See Montgomery, supra note 58; Smith, supra note 58. See also Nunn, A New
Europe-A New Military Strategy, Wash. Post, Apr. 24, 1990, at A25; Finding a New Role
for NATO in a New Germany, Jane's Defence Weekly, Jan. 26, 1991, at 113; Report,
supra note 39, at 12.
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The role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy and force posture is
being reevaluated in the new context of European security. NATO will
place substantially less reliance on nuclear weapons in the future, elimi-
nating nuclear artillery and land-based missiles in Europe and relying on
a greatly reduced number of nuclear capable aircraft to provide a sort of
minimum deterrence. 67 In terms of strategy, NATO is still unlikely
explicitly to renounce the possible first-use of nuclear weapons any time
soon, but rather to continue the modifications in force posture that may
ultimately create a defacto no-first-use policy. The indications so far are
that NATO will be able successfully to alter its strategy and forces along
these lines to continue to fulfil the military function of deterring war for
as long as the European NATO allies regard such residual deterrence as
a stabilizing force in Europe.
Even if there is a need for a residual NATO deterrence and defense
capability for some time to come, the more likely and immediate threats
to European security in the near future will arise from instabilities in
Central and Eastern Europe, including ethnic and nationality tensions
and domestic upheavals accompanying the transition to democracy and
to market economies. Can NATO military forces be reconfigured to
play a crisis management role in response to such situations? Should
they be?
To the extent that such instabilities touch on the frontiers of NATO
territory, the Alliance may decide further to develop highly mobile crisis
management forces, such as the Allied Command Europe ("ACE")
Mobile Force, which could be deployed quickly to trouble spots along
the NATO frontier. Such forces would supplement the "forward pres-
ence" capabilities already in place. During the Gulf War, for example,
the air component of the ACE Mobile Force, including air squadrons
from Germany, Italy, and Belgium, was deployed to Turkey to deter the
threat posed by Iraq to Turkish territory. 68 Spurred on by this experi-
ence, NATO defense ministers agreed in May 1991 to create a multina-
tional rapid reaction force of 50,000 to 70,000 troops capable of
responding quickly to threats to NATO territory. 6
9
A more contentious issue is whether such forces should undertake
crisis management or peacekeeping missions in trouble spots in Europe
but outside NATO territory. 70 Any such expanded military role for
NATO would be highly controversial for a number of reasons. It could
be seen as provocative by the Soviet Union and, possibly, by some East-
ern European states. It is also a role better performed by other more
broadly-based organizations such as CSCE or the United Nations.
67. See, e.g., Gordon, U.S. Shift Seen on Defense of Europe, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1990,
at A18; Kohl Remarks on NATO, War, Baltics Reported, FBIS-WEU, Jan. 30, 1991.
68. See U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Jan. 7, 1991), at 8.
69. See Montgomery, supra note 58; Smith, supra note 58.
70. The allies differ over whether the rapid reaction forces should be used in
disputes outside NATO territory. See Smith, supra note 58. For a fuller discussion of
the "out-of-area" debate, see infra notes 82-110 and accompanying text.
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Indeed, any amendment of the German constitution to provide
expressly for participation in military forces outside the NATO area will
likely be tied to UN authorization. 7 1
Ultimately, the European NATO allies may well decide that any col-
lective response, military or otherwise, to crises in Europe outside the
traditional NATO area is best handled by a pan-European institution
such as the CSCE or a West European institution such as the EC. 7 2 In
light of the considerable differences of view over any NATO military
role outside Western Europe and the ample challenges already posed by
the rapidly evolving political situation in Europe, NATO is best suited to
play a more narrowly focused military role, providing a residual deter-
rent against any reconstituted threat from the East and a crisis manage-
ment capability with respect to crises impinging on NATO borders but
not beyond them.
V. Redefining NATO's Political Role
The leaders of the Alliance indicated in the London Declaration, and
more recently in December 1990, that they intend to "enhance the polit-
ical component" of the Alliance. 7 In so declaring, the allies invoked
Article 2 of the Treaty, in which they commit themselves to the further
development of peaceful and friendly international relations, as well as
Article 4, which provides for consultation on threats to the security of
any of the allies without geographical restriction.
Yet the precise content of NATO's "enhanced" political role has
not been made clear. If it means more intensive consultation and coop-
eration among the allies on matters of traditional concern to the Alli-
ance-such as arms control in Europe and verification of Soviet troop
withdrawals-it will be useful in forging common positions. 74 NATO
could also take up issues such as limitations on the transfer of arms and
sensitive military technologies to tension-filled regions of the world, a
matter which could benefit from efforts to establish a more consistent
set of policies and practices. 75 NATO ministerial meetings could also
seek to coordinate cooperative political action in response to develop-
71. See infra notes 103-107 and accompanying text.
72. The French government is a strong proponent of creating a European rapid
reaction force under the control of the European Community. See Smith, Cheney to
Take Up French Proposal for European Force Outside NATO, Wash. Post, May 27, 1991, at
A27; Doughty, Secret Memo Reveals Deep Divisions on NATO Role, London Financial
Times, Feb. 8, 1991, at 3; Apple, Little Opposition Expressed by the West to Bush's Plans to
Revamp NATO, N.Y. Times, July 4, 1990, at A8; Davidson, France and Germany Align
Defence Positions, London Financial Times, Apr. 27, 1990, at 28.
73. London Declaration, supra note 34, at 2 (para. 2); Communique, supra note
38, at 22 (para. 2).
74. See Secretary of State Baker's proposal to establish a NATO arms control ver-
ification staff, in Baker, A New Europe, supra note 44, at 3.
75. The need for improved efforts to regulate arms sales seems especially com-
pelling following the Gulf War. See, e.g., Kinzer, Germany Says It Seeks to Curb Its Arms
Exporters, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1991, at A12.
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ments and possible setbacks in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Such consultation gives the Western Europeans a valuable chance to
influence U.S. policy while at the same time providing a forum for the
United States to convey its views on developments in Europe.
The London Declaration seemed to have something more in mind,
however, when it spoke of building "new partnerships with all the
nations of Europe." 7 6 The degree to which NATO should be in the
forefront of forging such partnerships is a subject of dispute among the
allies. Although they agreed to invite the Soviet Union and the states of
Eastern and Central Europe to establish diplomatic liaison relationships
with NATO, there is no clear agreement within the Alliance over how
extensive such contacts should be. The United States would like to
strengthen these contacts, and thus expand NATO's role in exchanges
and cooperation with the countries of the East, while France would pre-
fer to see such NATO contacts strictly limited, with CSCE playing the
central role in building bridges across the European continent.7 7 In
light of the many uncertainties and potential instability in the Soviet
Union, however, the Eastern Europeans may well desire closer ties to
NATO as insurance against uncertainty. Czechoslovak President Vaclav
Havel, meeting with NATO officials in March 1991, warned of the
"political, economic and security vacuum" in Eastern Europe 78 and
urged that the Atlantic Alliance "should not be forever closed to neigh-
boring countries" pursuing the goals of freedom and democracy. 79 Yet
steps toward formal Eastern European membership in the Alliance would
risk antagonizing and isolating the Soviet leadership and thus could
undermine European security. Not surprisingly, NATO leaders were
cautious in response to Havel's discussion about potentially broadening
NATO's membership, reiterating instead their intent to "broaden and
deepen" NATO's diplomatic and military contacts with Eastern Europe.
8 0
The degree to which NATO should expand beyond its current member-
ship, however, will remain a delicate and possibly contentious issue in
the decade ahead.
Another potential "enhanced" political role for NATO would be to
serve as an instrument for helping to resolve intra-European conflicts
involving ethnic and nationality disputes. Compared to CSCE, however,
NATO has neither the capabilities nor the composition to perform disin-
terested mediation. In supporting the development of CSCE's institu-
tional structures, including a CSCE Conflict Prevention Center in
76. London Declaration, supra note 34, at 2 (para. 4).
77. See Doughty, supra note 72.
78. Drozdiak, Havel Urges NATO to Seek Ties with East's New Democracies, Wash. Post,
Mar. 22, 1991, at A22, col. 3.
79. Id. at A18, col. 4.
80. Id. at A22, col. 5. Any expansion of the Alliance's membership would require
the unanimous agreement of its current members, see supra note 14 and accompany-
ing text, and is unlikely to happen given French opposition to any moves in this
direction.
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Vienna, the allies seem to have recognized this fact.8 '
In sum, it is not yet clear that there is an "enhanced" political mis-
sion for the Alliance beyond its traditional role of providing a vehicle for
political consultation and cooperative action on developments that
directly affect the security of its members. By continuing to provide a
political caucus of the Western democracies in these times of turmoil
and transition in Eastern Europe, NATO can perform a valuable stabiliz-
ing function. By attempting to take on a broader political agenda, how-
ever, NATO risks spreading itself too thin, exposing disagreements
among its members and thereby hampering its own effectiveness as a
much-needed "anchor of stability" in Europe.
VI. NATO and Out-of-Area Conflicts
An even more controversial issue is whether the Alliance should focus
greater efforts on responding collectively to security threats from
outside of Europe, most notably the Middle East. The allies have long
recognized that regional conflicts outside of Europe may affect their
security. Yet they consistently have resisted collective NATO action in
response to out-of-area conflicts.8 2 The North Atlantic Treaty does not
preclude joint NATO action in such cases, but neither does it require
it.8 3 Under Article 4 of the Treaty, the allies are only obliged to "con-
sult" regarding security threats beyond the geographical bounds of the
NATO area.8 4 As the Harmel Report noted, "In accordance with estab-
lished usage the Allies or such of them as wish to do so will.., consult
on such problems without commitment and as the case may demand."8 5
The difficulty of achieving even ad hoc cooperation on such matters in
the past suggests that future efforts to reach agreement on a formal Alli-
ance role in conflicts outside the NATO area bear little prospect of suc-
cess. Even so, some U.S. officials and some British officials have urged
81. See London Declaration, supra note 34, at 4 (para. 22). See also Charter of Paris
for a New Europe, adopted on November 21, 1990, at the Summit Meeting of the
Heads of State or Government of the States participating in the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe [hereinafter Charter of Paris], reprinted in United
Nations General Assembly Doc. A/45/859, at 21 (1990) (establishing Conflict Pre-
vention Center); and Supplementary Document to Give Effect to Certain Provisions Contained
in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, reprinted in id. at 46-48 (describing Conflict
Prevention Center).
82. See Kupchan, Regional Security and the Out-of-Area Problem, in SECURING
EuRoPE's FUTURE 280-299 (S. Flanagan & F. Hampson eds. 1986). During the first
decade of the Atlantic Alliance, the European allies sought American support in
defense of their overseas possessions, such as in the Suez crisis of 1956. The United
States, however, opposed the use of force by Britain and France in response to the
nationalization of the Suez canal by Egyptian President Nassar. Id. at 283. Since the
mid-1960s, the tables have turned and the European allies have resisted American
efforts to secure their support for U.S. involvement in Third World conflicts. Id. at
283-284.
83. See supra notes 9 and 10 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
85. Harmel Report, supra note 48, at 52 (para. 15).
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that the Alliance consider taking on such roles in the future.8 6 NATO's
Supreme Commander, General Galvin, has long advocated creating a
highly mobile "fire brigade" force which NATO could deploy to trouble
spots outside Europe.8 7
The French government is strongly opposed to any moves in this
direction, as are a number of other allies, including Norway and Spain.88
In keeping with France's historical resistance to U.S.-led efforts to
expand the scope of NATO's role, French officials instead advocate
developing European capabilities to respond to out-of-area crises
through the WEU. 89 German and Italian officials have voiced support
for such an effort on several occasions. 90 It is worth noting in this con-
nection that the treaty obligation undertaken by WEU members to pro-
vide mutual military assistance is broader than that undertaken by the
NATO allies.91
The response of the NATO allies during the Gulf War strongly sug-
gests that NATO's role in future out-of-area crises is not likely to go
much beyond agreement to consult in order to "consider what individual
or joint action may be most appropriate under the circumstances." '92 It
is hard to imagine a more compelling case for coordinated NATO action
in response to a threat from outside the traditional NATO area than the
Gulf War. The security interests of the allies were directly threatened by
Iraq: Turkey's territory was at risk, and the dependence of the European
86. See, e.g., Secretary of State James Baker, Challenges Facing the Atlantic Alliance,
excerpts from North Atlantic Council intervention, NATO Headquarters, Brussels,
Belgium, Dec. 17, 1990, reprinted in U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 1, No. 17
(Dec. 24, 1990), at 353; Smith, Cheney Said to Seek Aid from NATO States, Wash. Post,
Dec. 7, 1990, at A25. See also Abshire, NATO Can Ponder a Global Role.. ., Wall St.J.
(European ed.), Aug. 24, 1990, at 12.
87. Wilson, NATO Commander Envisions 'Fire Brigade' Role, Wash. Post, Dec. 5,
1990, at A29. As noted earlier, the allies disagree over whether the rapid deploy-
ment force agreed to in May 1991 should intervene in disputes outside NATO terri-
tory. See Smith, supra note 58.
88. See Smith, supra note 72; Doughty, supra note 72; Mecham, Europe Searches for
Own Voice in Future International Conflicts, AvIATrON WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Dec.
24, 1990, at 37; Smith, supra note 86.
89. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 72; German, French Groups Propose NATO Change,
FBIS-WEU, Nov. 15, 1990, at 1.
90. See, e.g., Whitney, Amid Gulf Crisis and Cold War End, Questions on U.S. and NATO
Roles, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1990, at A10; Marshall, Kohl Discusses a Wider Role for Ger-
man Military, L.A. Times, Mar. 14, 1991, at 11; Kohl, SPD Clash on East Germany, Tax
Policy, Role of Military, This Week in Germany, Mar. 15, 1991, at 1; CDU Favors Military
Role Outside NATO, FBIS-WEU, March 11, 1991, at 8; German, French Groups Propose
NATO Change, supra note 89; Riding, supra note 46.
91. Article 5 of the modified Brussels Treaty provides that if any of the parties are
the object of an armed attack, the other parties will "afford the Party so attacked all
the military and other aid and assistance in their power." P. BORCIER, supra note 35,
at 15. Modified Article 8 also provides that the WEU Council shall be convened at
the request of any of the parties "in order to permit them to consult with regard to
any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat
should arise, or a danger to economic stability." Id.
92. Communique, supra note 38, at 24 (para. 15). See, e.g., Kamen, NATO: Grow-
ing Irrelevant?, Wash. Post, Sept. 16, 1990, *at A33.
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allies on oil from the region was clear. NATO did deploy the air compo-
nent of the ACE Mobile Force to Turkey,9 3 and NATO affirmed its com-
mitment to defend Turkish territory under Article 5 of the North
Atlantic Treaty.9 4 Even so, Germany expressed considerable ambiva-
lence about participating in a defense of Turkish territory in response to
a possible attack from Iraq.9 5 Moreover, it was the WEU, not NATO,
that served to coordinate the European naval presence in the Gulf,95
just as it had coordinated European naval activity in defense of neutral
shipping during the earlier Iran-Iraq war.9 7 To be sure, individual
NATO allies, particularly Britain and France, made substantial contribu-
tions to the multinational forces in the Gulf, but these contributions
were not coordinated under NATO auspices.98
The German constitutional debate may provide another constraint
on expanding NATO's role in out-of-area contingencies. Although
many constitutional law scholars disagreed, the German government
interpreted the constitution as precluding German participation in the
UN-authorized multinational force in the Gulf.99 The specific language
of Germany's Basic Law is less than clear on this point.10 0 It provides,
"Apart from defence, the Armed Forces may only be used to the extent
93. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
94. Statement on the Gulf, issued by the North Atlantic Council on December 17, 1990,
para. 5, reprinted in U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Dec. 24, 1990, at 354.
95. See, e.g., Fisher, Germany Reluctant to Defend Turkey if Iraq Retaliates, Wash. Post,
Jan. 22, 1991, at A20; Bonn's Gulf Response Said Confused, Improvised, Der Spiegel, Jan.
28, 1991, reprinted in FBIS-WEU, Feb. 7, 1991, at 11-17; Vogel Bundestag Statement on
Gulf, USSR, FBIS-WEU, Feb. 1, 1991, at 10-11.
96. See Riding, Western Europe Urges Air Embargo Against Iraq, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19,
1990, at A12; Whitney, supra note 90.
97. See Whitney, supra note 90.
98. See Healy, NATO Fumbles a Chance to Find a Post-Cold War Role, L.A. Times, Aug.
18, 1990, at A 1l.
99. See Fisher, Kohl Seeks a Charter Shift for Future UN Wars, Wash. Post, Mar. 1,
1991, at A31.
100. The main provisions of Germany's Basic Law concerning military forces
include the following:
Article 24 (Entry into a collective security system)
(1) The Federation may by legislation transfer sovereign powers to inter-
governmental institutions.
(2) For the maintenance of peace, the Federation may enter a system of
mutual collective security; in doing so it will consent to such limitations upon
its rights of sovereignty as will bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting
order in Europe and among the nations of the world.
(3) For the settlement of disputes between states, the Federation will accede
to agreements concerning international arbitration of a general, comprehen-
sive and obligatory nature.
Article 26 (Ban on war of aggression)
(1) Acts tending to and undertaken with intent to disturb the peaceful rela-
tions between nations, especially to prepare for aggressive war, shall be
unconstitutional. They shall be made a punishable offence.
(2) Weapons designed for warfare may not be manufactured, transported or
marketed except with the permission of the Federal Government. Details
shall be regulated by a federal law.
Article 87a (Build-up, strength, use and functions of the Armed Forces)
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explicitly permitted by this Basic Law." 10 1 It also provides, "For the
maintenance of peace, the Federation may enter a system of mutual
security." 10 2 In the aftermath of the Gulf War, German Chancellor
Helmut Kohl has advocated a constitutional amendment that explicitly
would permit German participation in forces authorized by the United
Nations, including both peacekeeping operations by UN "Blue Helmet"
forces and UN-authorized forces such as the one in the Gulf.10 3 Kohl
has also indicated that he would support German involvement in a Euro-
pean force outside the traditional NATO area. 10 4 Foreign Minister
Genscher has advocated a constitutional amendment permitting partici-
pation in any UN-authorized force,' 0 5 but the Social Democratic Party
("SPD") is opposed to any amendment that goes beyond participation in
UN "Blue Helmet" peacekeeping operations. 10 6 In light of the SPD
position, any constitutional amendment likely to garner the necessary
two-thirds majority in the German parliament may not even authorize
German participation in UN "enforcement" actions such as that in the
Gulf, let alone involvement in a NATO out-of-area force. The German
government may, however, revise its interpretation of the constitution
and conclude that it already permits German participation in some UN-
authorized military activities. 10 7
Quite apart from German constitutional concerns, any enhanced
formal role for NATO in out-of-area conflicts might compete inappro-
priately with the role of the United Nations. This would depend on
whether the out-of-area threat facing the Alliance is a military threat to
the territory of one of the allies from outside the NATO area, on the one
(1) The Federation shall build up Armed Forces for defence purposes. Their
numerical strength and general organizational structure shall be shown in the
budget.
(2) Apart from defence, the Armed Forces may only be used to the extent
explicitly permitted by this Basic Law.
P. STARES, ALLIED RIGHTS AND LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON GERMAN MILITARY POWER 145,
146 (1990).
101. Id at 146 (art. 87a(2)).
102. Id at 145 (art. 24(2)). Willy Wimmer, state secretary in the German Defense
Ministry, interprets this provision to permit German participation in UN-authorized
forces without a constitutional amendment. See Official on UN Operations, Soviet Troops,
FBIS-WEU, March 5, 1991, at 17-18 ("It is possible for our Armed Forces to operate
outside the NATO area without amending the constitution, for the simple reason
that we became a member of the United Nations without any restrictions. Our own
constitution says that we are allowed to join a system of collective security any time.
If the Security Council asked us to send troops we would have to do so.").
103. See Marshall, supra note 90; Fisher, supra note 99.
104. See Marshall, supra note 90; Kohl, SPD Clash on Eastern Germany, Tax Policy, Role
of Military, supra note 90. See also CDU Favors Military Role Outside NATO, supra note 90.
105. See Genscher on German Role, Aftermath in Gulf, FBIS-WEU, Mar. 4, 1991, at 11;
Genscher Addresses Bundestag on Gulf, FBIS-WEU, Feb. 1, 1991, at 8.
106. See Tagliabue, German Socialists Oppose the Use of Troops Outside NATO Area, N.Y.
Times, June 2, 1991, at 1:13. See also Kinzer, Genscher at Eye of Policy Debate, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 22, 1991, at A10; SPD Supports Bundeswehr Actions Outside NATO, FBIS-
WEU, Mar. 7, 1991, at 8-9.
107. See Fisher, Germany to Send Troops to Iran to Aid Refugees, Wash. Post, Apr. 24,
1991, at A23.
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hand, or is a broader out-of-area threat to the interests of one or more of
the allies, on the other. While NATO is obligated under Article 5 of the
North Atlantic Treaty, and entitled under Article 51 of the UN Charter,
to take military action in collective defense of any of its members who
are subject to an armed attack,10 8 a more open-ended military and crisis
management role for NATO not tied to the North Atlantic area could
interfere with responsibilities more appropriately exercised by a reinvi-
gorated UN Security Council. 10 9 Moreover, a greater NATO out-of-
area role is likely to be viewed with suspicion and resentment by Third
World States as a condominium of former colonial powers acting to pro-
tect their own interests at the expense of weaker states.
In light of these various considerations and constraints, the Alliance
should address security concerns that do not involve a military threat to
NATO territory through consultation and perhaps ad hoc cooperation
rather than as a matter of formal commitment to joint action. Coopera-
tion on use of bases, airlifts, and supplies in such contingencies can be
the subject of bilateral agreements between individual NATO allies." 0
But efforts to go beyond the flexible, ad hoc approach provided for in
Article 4 of the Treaty could undermine the ability of the NATO allies to
cooperate in response to political developments within Europe by expos-
ing and exacerbating the numerous differences of view and interest
among the allies regarding crises outside of Europe.
VII. NATO's Relationship to other European Security Institutions
Since its establishment in 1949, the Alliance has grown accustomed to
being the central security institution in Western Europe. Efforts to
develop a European defense identity through the WEU or otherwise
have not caused any serious questioning of NATO's primacy until
recently. In today's radically changed environment, however, with the
prospect of a "Europe whole and free" more real than ever before,
NATO's relevance to the broader spectrum of European security con-
cerns is not self-evident. Indeed, institutions like the CSCE, the EC, and
the WEU seem to many Europeans to hold out more promise as vehicles
for addressing the multi-faceted challenges to European security and
stability in the years ahead. This perforce suggests a less dominant
future role for NATO.
Several European allies, particularly France and Germany, support
further development of the WEU as the beginning of a European
defense identity that could ultimately become a security component of
108. See supra note 22 and text accompanying note 7.
109. Recall that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1949 expressed the
view that even consultation under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty "should not
be held under the treaty unless the United Nations is for some reason prevented
from dealing with the particular situation which has arisen." See supra note 24 and
accompanying text.
110. For a discussion of options for multilateral cooperation, see Kupchan, supra
note 82, at 293-297.
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the European Community."1 ' The United States and Britain, in con-
trast, favor development of the WEU as a European pillar of the Alli-
ance. 112 In that role, it would reinforce rather than compete with
NATO, preserving a strong transatlantic security link well into the
future.
In December 1990, the North Atlantic Council proclaimed that
security in Europe can best be achieved "by a framework of interlocking
institutions in which the interests of all European states can be accom-
modated."1 1 3 That framework would include the Alliance, CSCE, and
"the process of European integration."' 1 4 The communique finessed
the divisive issues surrounding the development and evolution of a
uniquely European defense entity. On the one hand, the communique
welcomed a "European security identity and defense role, reflected in
the construction of a European pillar within the Alliance."" 5 On the
other hand, it went on to "support current efforts to strengthen the
security dimension in the process of European political integration."' 16
These are two quite different visions for the locus of a European security
identity, with significant implications for NATO's future defense role.
In the near term, it is quite possible for closer European defense
cooperation through the WEU to progress as both a pillar of NATO and
as a potentially separate European defense organization. Indeed, on the
operational level, some of NATO's new multinational corps, comprised
solely of European forces, could potentially wear both a WEU and a
NATO hat, and "dual track" command structures could conceivably be
established.' 17 In the longer term, however, there is clearly a fork in the
road: contentious issues concerning the relation between NATO, the
WEU, and the EC must eventually be faced.
In all likelihood, the Atlantic Alliance will continue to provide a sta-
bilizing transatlantic foundation for European security for some time to
come. Yet a separate European "security identity" potentially offers
many advantages in the longer term. It could, for example, extend
security guarantees or even membership to Eastern European states
without necessarily being seen as provocative by Moscow. Moreover,
French resistance is likely to limit NATO's ability to enhance its own
political role in the future, including further development of ties with
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In short, a uniquely European
defense identity could have a greater flexibility and capacity to evolve in
111. See Mauthner, supra note 46. See also Drozdiak, supra note 45; Riding, supra
note 46.
112. See Mauthner, supra note 46; Drozdiak, supra note 45.
113. Communique, supra note 38, at 23 (para. 7).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 22 (para. 5) (emphasis added).
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Forces Assigned to NATO, WEU Considered, FBIS-WEU, Feb. 26, 1991
(discussing "two-hat" concept); Preparing the Path for a European Army, JANE's DEFENCE
WEEKLY, Jan. 5, 1991, at 15 (discussing the "bottom-up" approach for creating a
European army proposed by WEU Secretary-General Willem van Eekelen).
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response to changing conditions in Europe than NATO. It could also
reassure Germany's neighbors, just as NATO has, that Germany's sub-
stantial military capabilities remain integrated in a collective European
institution.
Even so, the path of constructing a European security identity
attached to the EC is not without substantial obstacles. First, efforts to
add a military dimension to the EC could well detract from the Commu-
nity's urgent "civilian" task of aiding in the economic reconstruction of
Eastern Europe. It could also complicate the related task of determining
what kind of formal relationships the EC will establish with the states of
Eastern Europe. Second, the leaders of Western Europe have sufficient
differences of view on matters of foreign and defense policy that a com-
mon security policy, let alone a common military force, may be difficult
to achieve for some time.' 1 8 Third, the memberships of the WEU, the
EC, and NATO do not overlap neatly, making transitions somewhat
more difficult. Norway and Turkey are members of NATO but not of
the WEU, yet their territory is more exposed than the other states of
Western Europe. Their relationship with the WEU (and the EC) would
need to be resolved. Moreover, three members of the EC are not mem-
bers of the WEU, namely, Denmark, Greece, and neutral Ireland, com-
plicating any proposed merger of the WEU and the EC. Nevertheless,
the WEU may provide the best available institutional foundation for
building a European security identity in the decades ahead if the polit-
ical consensus to do so can be sustained.
In the meantime, a further developed CSCE or EC will shoulder the
burden in responding to the most immediate challenges to European
security, such as the need to protect the rights of ethnic minorities in
Eastern Europe, to resolve secessionist disputes, and to root democratic
freedoms and institutions and economic reforms more deeply.' 19 The
Alliance has already acknowledged the growing importance of CSCE
with its inclusive pan-European membership and its potential to address
the broad and complex security concerns growing out of the political,
economic and social transformation of Eastern Europe. 120 What
remains to be seen is whether the CSCE Conflict Prevention Center
established in November 1990, or the special emergency procedures
agreed to in June 1991, will enable the CSCE to respond effectively to
the sorts of crises likely to face Europe in the years ahead. 121 The "con-
118. The differences that surfaced in Western Europe in response to the Gulf War
have made some European leaders more pessimistic about forging a common Euro-
pean foreign and defense policy in the near future. See Gulf War: European Unity Fails
Its First Test, JANE's DEFENCE WEEKLY, Feb. 9, 1991, at 177; Drozdiak, supra note 45.
119. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., London Declaration, supra note 34, at 3-4 (paras. 21-22); Communi-
que, supra note 38, at 23 (para. 8). For a proposal to enhance CSCE's conflict resolu-
tion role, see Flynn & Scheffer, Limited Collective Security, 80 FOREIGN POLICY 77
(1990).
121. Charter of Paris, supra note 81, at 21; Fisher, European Security-Crisis Policy Set,
Wash. Post, June 21, 1991, at A24 (CSCE member states agreed that emergency ses-
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sensus principle" on which CSCE operates is likely to impede it from
taking effective action just when its mediating capabilities are needed
most, as, for example, in response to the civil war in Yugoslavia or to
potential ethnic violence or military crackdowns in the Soviet republics.
But CSCE still holds out enormous promise if its institutions can be
developed to implement effectively the principles from which it
sprang.122
Conclusion
The dramatic changes in Europe in the last few years have met and even
exceeded the original political objectives of the North Atlantic Alliance.
The Soviet Union is withdrawing its forces from Eastern Europe; West-
ern Europe is strong and prosperous; Germany is united and securely
integrated into Western institutions; and Communism in Eastern
Europe has collapsed. The urgency of the Alliance's original military
purpose-to deter Soviet aggression against Western Europe and to
defend NATO territory in the event of an attack-has receded dramati-
cally with the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the diminishing Soviet
military presence in Eastern Europe. Even as NATO is attempting to
modify and pare down its military objectives in light of changed circum-
stances, it is struggling to define a meaningful political role for itself. To
paraphrase Dean Acheson's comment about the decline of the British
empire: NATO has lost a mission and has not yet found a role.123 It is
floundering for an "enhanced political dimension" at a time when the
political commitment necessary to forge a consensus on any such role is
declining as other institutions, most notably the CSCE, the EC, and the
WEU, vie for the political attention and energies of the European allies.
To say that NATO is less relevant to the problems of European
security, however, is not to say that it is irrelevant. The Alliance does
have a valuable, even if somewhat residual, role to play in European
sions can be convened if a minimum of 13 countries agree, but any action requires
the approval of all 35 CSCE member countries). See the excellent discussion in J.
Dean, The New CSCE Centerfor Prevention of Conflict-Can it Do the Job?, paper presented
at Cornell University, March 4, 1991, for some cautionary concerns in this regard.
122. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975, which was the concluding document of the
CSCE meeting in Helsinki in 1975, is a statement of common policy. The Final Act
declares that ten principles will guide the mutual relations of the participating states:
sovereign equality and respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; refraining from
the threat or use of force; inviolability of frontiers; territorial integrity of States;
peaceful settlement of disputes; non-intervention in internal affairs; respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, con-
science, religion or belief; equal rights and self-determination of peoples; co-opera-
tion among States; and fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international
law. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Final Act, Aug. 31, 1975,
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL: ISSUES AND AGREEMENTS (C. Blacker & G.
Duffy eds. 1984). These ten principles were reaffirmed in the Charter of Paris, supra
note 81, at 4.
123. See Acheson, Our Atlantic Alliance: The Political and Economic Strands, 29 VITAL
SPEECHES, No. 6, at 163-64 (1963) ("Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found
a role.").
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security in the future. In light of the Soviet Union's uncertain political
evolution, the transatlantic security link provided by the Alliance will be
important for many years to come. Moreover, NATO can serve as a use-
ful political caucus of the Western democracies to discuss arms control
in Europe and possible common policies in response to developments in
Eastern Europe and elsewhere. Habits of political cooperation have
been shaped over a generation and should be continued.
Fortunately, the flexibility of the North Atlantic Treaty with respect
to both the means of self-defense and accompanying institutional struc-
tures is a tremendous asset in adapting to changing circumstances. As a
result of this flexibility, the Atlantic Alliance of 1949 can continue to
provide a valuable transatlantic security link and political relationship
between the democracies of North America and Western Europe, even
as the integrated military forces and organizational structures of NATO
are modified significantly. The Treaty has several other strong points: it
encourages consultation but does not compel joint action in response to
out-of-area contingencies; and it provides for consultation and review of
the Treaty in response to the changing factors affecting European secur-
ity, including the development of other institutions designed to maintain
peace and security. 124
The real challenge for NATO as an institution will be to reconcile
the fact of the continuing need for an alliance with the reality of its
reduced role in promoting European security. NATO is being kept "on
tap" as a hedge against a return to older patterns of conflict and tension.
Rather than groping for new and grander roles (such as out-of-area
"trouble shooting"), NATO should accept a less dominant role grace-
fully. This, alas, is easier said than done; organizations do not flourish
when they are diminishing in importance. But, having served the pur-
poses for which it was established so ably, NATO must learn to be "on
tap" without being "on top."
124. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
Vol. 24
